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Kim Brooks∗

Abstract
The proposal made in this paper is a modest one: that high-income countries should further the cause of reducing global
inequality by ensuring that in their tax treaties with low-income countries they do not usurp needed revenues by reducing
low-income countries’ ability to collect tax on income with a source in the low-income country. This argument is made in
the specific context of the taxation of royalty payments, which present one of the most extreme examples of high-income
countries unfairly confiscating revenues that appropriately belong to their low-income treaty partners. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) model tax treaty, which most high-income countries in the world closely
follow in negotiating their own tax treaties, provides that to avoid double taxation, source countries (invariably low-income
countries) should reduce their rate of withholding tax on royalty payments to zero. Thus low-income countries that enter into
tax treaties modelled on the OECD model convention are unable to levy a tax on royalty payments that have a source in their
jurisdiction. In many cases, this simply results in a net transfer of revenue from the low-income country’s treasury to the
treasury of the high-income country. In making the general case for source taxation of royalty payments, the paper examines
and compares Canadian and Australian tax treaty policies to see to what extent those countries have followed the OECD
model convention in negotiating with low-income countries.

I. TAX TREATIES AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT,
AND FOR REVENUE ALLOCATION
A. Giving with One Hand, Taking with the Other
One of the most urgent problems facing the world is the huge divide in material living
standards, and in every other indicia of human development, between high-income
and low-income countries. Of the 177 countries tracked in the United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development Report 2005, only 57 were
categorized as high human development and they had average GDP per capita in
∗
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(PPP) US dollars of $25,665; the 88 countries the program labelled as medium human
development countries had an average GDP per capita of $4,474; and 32 low human
development countries had an average GDP per capita of only $1,046.1 These
disparities in living conditions are intolerable.
At one point, orthodox economic theory was interpreted as suggesting that the level of
incomes in rich and poor countries would converge. Investment would flow from rich
countries, where capital is in abundant supply and thus returns low, to poor countries,
where capital is in short supply and thus returns much higher. The brutal facts behind
the on-going economic crises in Africa and the continued stagnation in much of Latin
America and parts of Asia have rendered this theory unsustainable.2
A number of well-known development economists have recently called for urgent and
drastic action to deal with the crises in world poverty and inequality. Jeffrey Sachs,
known for his work as economic advisor to governments around the world and
director of Columbia University’s Earth Institute, has published a plan calling for
roughly $150 billion in additional foreign aid a year. He contends that properly
disbursed this amount could bring an end to mass destitution (such as the $1.1 billion
extremely poor living on less than $1 a day) within 20 years.3 Branco Milanovic, an
economist with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the World Bank,
in a book in which he scrupulously documents the increasing income inequalities
between countries, calls for global redistribution through taxes that would be levied on
the world’s rich by an international, authorized body.4 As an indication of the
immediacy with which people now view the problem of global inequality, both of
these somewhat technical books have become best sellers over the past year.
By comparison to these bold schemes for reducing global inequality, the proposal
made in this paper is modest, but not necessarily insignificant in the long-run. Highincome countries should further the cause of reducing global inequality by ensuring
that in their tax treaties with low-income countries they do not usurp needed revenues
by reducing low-income countries’ ability to collect tax on income with a source in the
low-income country. In this paper, this argument is made in the specific context of the
taxation of royalty payments, which present one of the most extreme examples of
high-income countries unfairly confiscating revenues that appropriately belong to their
low-income treaty partners. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) model tax treaty, which most high-income countries in the
world closely follow in negotiating their own tax treaties, provides that to avoid
double taxation, source countries (invariably low-income countries) should reduce
their rate of withholding tax on royalties payments to zero.5 Thus low-income
1

United Nations, Human Development Report (2005) table 14.
For a collection of papers on globalization, law and development representing a range of views on the
best approach to ensure globalization promotes the development of all countries see the symposium in
(2004) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law. See also Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik and Arvind
Subramanian, ‘How to Help Poor Countries’ (2005) 84 Foreign Affairs 136 (arguing that wealthy
countries should provide developing countries with the ability to design their own economic policies,
and that developed countries can support developing countries achieve that end by offering increased
aid with fewer onerous reporting restrictions, reducing trade inequities, financing new developmentfriendly technologies, and opening up labour markets).
3
Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (2005).
4
Branko Milanovic, Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequalities (2005).
5
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital: Condensed Version (2005) [OECD model convention] art 14.
2
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countries that enter into tax treaties modelled on the OECD model convention are
unable to levy a tax on royalty payments that have a source in their jurisdiction. In
many cases, as is argued in more detail below, this simply results in a net transfer of
revenue from the low-income country’s treasury to the treasury of the high-income
country.
Low-income countries are, of course, desperate for revenues to provide basic health
care and education for their populations and to construct modern transportation and
communication systems to increase the productivity of their workers. It seems
incongruous, some might even say immoral, for high-income countries to, on the one
hand, admit the moral case and the pragmatic need for providing aid to low-income
countries, but, on the other hand, to enter into tax treaties with them that deny them
the ability to collect revenue from income earned in their jurisdictions that normative
principles of international tax suggest they have a right to tax. In making the general
case for source taxation of royalty payments, I examine and compare the Canadian and
Australian tax treaty policies to see to what extent those countries have followed the
OECD model convention in negotiating with low-income countries.
The suggestion that high-income countries should use their tax systems and, in
particular, tax treaties, to assist low-income countries, is not novel.6 Almost from the
emergence of tax treaty negotiations in the 1920s and 1930s, low-income countries
have recognized the importance of appropriately drafted tax treaties in preserving their
revenue raising capacities. The United Nations has had the problem under on-going
review since the late 1960s. A number of articles have been written over the years
making the case for strong source taxation generally and arguing that this jurisdiction
to tax should be preserved in treaties.7 Recently, Karen Brown, a tax professor at
George Washington University Law School, has written a series of articles arguing
that the United States should modify its tax treaty stance and its domestic tax rules to
encourage US companies to invest in low-income countries, particularly African
nations.8 Reuven Avi-Yonah, a tax professor at The University of Michigan Law
School, has written extensively on the need to curb international tax competition to
protect the tax bases of low-income countries.9
Naturally, there are other

6

Most fundamentally, determining whether a particular stream of income should be taxed at its source or
in the country of the taxpayer’s residence is simply a question about tax fairness – how should the tax
revenues be fairly shared? As noted by Richard Bird and Scott Wilkie, “the source-residence question
is, essentially, ‘who gets how much tax?’.” See Richard Bird and Scott Wilkie, ‘Source- vs. Residencebased Taxation in the European Union: The Wrong Question?’ in Sijbren Cnossen (ed), Taxing Capital
Income in the European Union: Issues and Options for Reform (2000) 78, 96. On the general question
of fairness and the taxation of international income, see Nancy Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of
International Income’ (1998) 29 Law & Policy in International Business 145.
7
See below n 29.
8
Karen B. Brown, ‘Transforming the Unilateralist into the Internationalist: New Tax Treaty Policy
Toward Developing Countries’ in Karen B Brown and Mary Louise Fellows (eds), Taxing America
(1996) 214; Karen B Brown, ‘Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate
Investment in Developing Countries?’ (2002) 23 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Economics and Law 45; Karen B Brown, ‘Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View’ (1999) 32
George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 311.
For a reply to Brown’s
argument see Paul B McDaniel, ‘The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in
Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis’ (2003) 35 George Washington International Law Review
265.
9
Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’ (2000)
113 Harvard Law Review 1573; Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Bridging the North/South Divide: International
Redistribution and Tax Competition’ (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 371.
170

eJournal of Tax Research

Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries:
A Comparison of Canada and Australia’s Policies

commentators who take the view that tax system changes and tax treaties, in
particular, have more than functioned ineffectively, and have failed to function at all
as a means for assisting low-income countries.10
B. The Evolution of Double Tax Treaties
Tax treaties are generally regarded as important instruments for the promotion of trade
and investment because they remove the potential for double taxation.11 Obviously, a
multinational enterprise or investor in one country is more likely to be willing to do
business or invest in another country if it can be confident that it will not be subject to
double tax on the income it earns in that country. The potential for double tax arises
since many countries assert jurisdiction to tax on the basis of both residence and
source. They tax persons who are resident in their jurisdiction (or who have similar
strong economic connections) on their world-wide income and they tax non-residents
on income that they earn that has a source in their jurisdiction. Consequently,
whenever a person resident in one country earns income with a source in another
country both countries are likely to assert their right to tax the income. Traditionally,
this potential for double tax has been alleviated somewhat because most countries
provide that their residents can claim a foreign tax credit for any taxes they might have
had to pay on income with a source in another country. However, tax treaties –
agreements between the two countries about how they will structure their taxes on
flows of incomes between them – are potentially a more comprehensive, certain, and
fair way of removing the potential for double taxation.
The most obvious way to remove the potential for double taxation is for the source
country to agree with its treaty partner not to tax the income earned in its jurisdiction.
This approach would promote foreign economic activities since corporations and
investors will not have to be concerned about the details of the tax laws in the foreign
countries in which they operate. If the income flows between the two countries are
about equal there would be no revenue loss to either government. Each country would
forgo taxes on the income earned in its country by residents of its treaty partner, but
would increase the revenues collected on the income earned by its residents in treaty
partner countries since the treaty partner would not impose any source tax. However,
if the income flows between the countries are not reciprocal, then limiting taxation in
the source country as a mechanism for removing double taxation will have a
significant effect on the fair allocation of tax revenue between the two jurisdictions.
Hence the conflicting positions taken by high-income countries (generally capital
exporting countries) and low-income countries (generally capital importing countries)
in treaty negotiations. High-income countries would prefer to negotiate tax treaties in
which the residence jurisdiction is given primacy to tax; low-income countries would
prefer to negotiate tax treaties in which the source jurisdiction is given primacy to tax.
Although countries’ positions as net capital importers or exporters may change over
time and by type of income, at a general level this conflict is evident throughout the
evolution of double tax treaties.

10

See, eg, Allison Christians, ‘Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case
Study’ (Research Paper No 05-15, Northwestern Law & Economics, 2005).
11
Tax treaties facilitate trade and investment in a number of ways in addition to removing the potential
for double taxation. For a succinct statement of the purpose of tax treaties see US, American Law
Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Tentative Draft No. 16, United States Income Tax Treaties
(1991) 1, 1–14.
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The story of the development of modern double tax treaties has been often and well
told and only the highlights will be noted here to provide some context for the
proposals suggested in this paper. By the 1920s, rates of income taxation in
industrialized countries and the volume of international business had increased to the
point where double taxation had become a matter of worldwide significance. In 1920,
the League of Nations directed its Financial Committee to examine the issue. The
Committee, in turn, commissioned a report from a group of four prominent
economists, one each from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
and Italy. Their 1923 report was comprehensive and anticipated most of the debates
and issues relating to international double taxation.12 On the question of the right to
tax, they concluded that countries should have the jurisdiction to tax those persons
who owed them economic allegiance.13 They reviewed the implications of this
principle for various categories of wealth and income and concluded that for land and
business property, the country in which the taxpayer had a fixed location had the
strongest claim to the taxpayer’s economic allegiance;14 in contrast, for both tangible
and intangible personal property, the predominant claim of economic allegiance was
held to rest with the country in which the owner resided.15 Thus they thought that for
royalty payments, for example, the source country should cede the right to tax. They
recognized that this would create an imbalance between “creditor” and “debtor”
countries, but thought this might be resolved by some form of revenue sharing
between countries.16
Following the four economists’ report, the League continued working on the problems
of double taxation. In 1925, it published a report of a Committee of Technical
Experts17 and in the late 1920s it drafted a series of model treaties. Although the
legacy of the League’s preliminary work on double taxation treaties can be seen in
many aspects of modern tax treaty making, perhaps most significantly, its
interpretation of the economic allegiance principle - that the right to tax income
connected with a fixed business location should be accorded to the country in which it
is located, but that various forms of investment income should be taxed in the country
in which the owner is resident - continues to dominate international tax practice and
policy.
In the late 1920s the League appointed a permanent Fiscal Committee to monitor the
development of tax treaties.18 As part of its on-going work, in 1943, a regional
conference was held in Mexico. The conference was attended by the United States,

12

League of Nations, Economics and Financial Commission, Report on Double Taxation Submitted to
the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of
Nations document no E.F.S.73.F.19 (1923).
13
Concepts of economic allegiance as a basis of taxation preceded the four economists’ report. See
Georg von Schanz’ argument in 1892 that economic allegiance should act as the only principle to ensure
the fair and equitable distribution of tax revenues between countries. “Zur Frage der Steuerpflicht”
(1982) 9 II Finanzarchiv 1.
14
Ibid 24.
15
League of Nations, above n 12, 34.
16
Ibid 48.
17
Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion to
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc C.115. M.55. 1925 II (1925).
18
One of the most significant products of this Committee’s early work was the approval in 1934 of a
model treaty that adopted the “arm’s length” standard for allocating profits among related corporations
carrying on businesses in different countries. League of Nations Fiscal Committee, Report of the
Fourth Session of the Committee, League of Nations Doc No C.339 M.204.1933.IIA (26 June 1933).
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Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and a number of other Latin American countries.
The immediate objective of the conference was to settle tax problems between
countries in the Western Hemisphere; however, an important issue for discussion was
the continuing conflict over residence versus source principles. A majority of the
participants, who represented low-income countries, approved a draft model treaty that
gave taxation rights almost exclusively to source countries, with the burden of tax
relief, in order to prevent double taxation, assigned to the residence country. Not
surprisingly, the draft provided that royalties should be taxable only in the country
where the patent or similar right is exploited, but provided an exception for payments
for the right to use a musical, artistic, literary, scientific or other cultural work or
publication, which were to be taxed only by the residence state.19 This Mexico model
has been viewed as “the first attempt by the developing countries to write a model
treaty reflecting their particular problems.”20 Developed countries naturally regarded
the Mexico model as too biased towards the source-country principle and hence
another series of meetings was held in London under the Fiscal Committee’s auspices
in 1946. The London model that emerged from this conference was considerably
more biased in favour of residence countries. For example, with respect to royalties, it
called for the exclusive taxation by the country in which the grantor of the patent
resided.21 However, the source state was provided with some scope for taxing
royalties where the royalties were paid by an enterprise to another enterprise that had a
dominant participation in its management or capital, although the source state was
required to permit a deduction for all expenses, including depreciation.22 Negotiations
between high-income and low-income countries continued, but eventually stalled in
the early 1950s.
In the late 1950s, concerned about the effect of tax uncertainty on the increasing
amount of international trade and investment, the international business community
persuaded the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to form a
Fiscal Committee and charged it with the task of exploring the possibility of achieving
a uniform multi-lateral treaty for the avoidance of double taxation. In 1961, the OEEC
was re-constituted as the OECD, with the addition of the United States and Canada as
members. In 1963, the work of the Fiscal Committee culminated in the publication of
the OECD model bilateral income tax treaty. Although the committee had reviewed
both the Mexico and London models, its model treaty was closer to the London model
and reflected a strong residence bias. The 1963 OECD model convention has been
revised a number of times since and has become, without question, the most important
influence on tax treaty policy. Almost all tax treaties are based not only upon its
structure and outline but closely reflect its substantive policy judgements about the
most appropriate means of avoiding the potential of double taxation.
Not surprisingly, low-income countries felt that the OECD model convention was
inappropriate as a model agreement for concluding tax treaties between low-income

19

League of Nations, Fiscal Committee Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and Text (1946) 64. See
in particular Article X of the Mexico Model, paragraphs 2 and 3.
20
Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries,
UN Doc ST/ESA/94 (1979) 16. See also K C Wang, ‘International Double Taxation of Income: Relief
Through International Agreement’ (1945) 59 Harvard Law Review 73, 95.
21
League of Nations, Fiscal Committee Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and Text (1946) 65. See,
in particular, Article X, paragraph 2 of the London Model.
22
See Article X, paragraph 3 of the London Model.
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and high-income countries and recognized it would deprive them of badly needed
revenue from income flowing from their territories. Therefore, shortly after the
completion of the 1963 OECD model convention, the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations began a study of the principles that should underlie tax treaties
between high-income and low-income countries. In 1967 it established the Ad Hoc
Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries.
The group consisted of representatives from ten high-income and ten low-income
countries.23 Over the course of the next decade, the group issued eight reports on its
work,24 which provide a comprehensive discussion of many of the problems raised by
developed-developing country treaties; guidelines,25 and later a manual,26 for the
negotiation of such treaties; and finally, in 1980, a model treaty.27
Although the UN model convention was drafted with representatives from low-income
countries, it has been widely noted that it did not depart radically from the OECD
model convention, and indeed it amounts, by and large, to a commentary on the
OECD model.28 Nevertheless, the UN model convention reflects a much stronger
source-country bias than the OECD model. For example, for royalty payments, in
contrast to the OECD model convention, which extends the exclusive right to tax
royalties to the country in which the owner resides, the UN model convention does not
allocate the exclusive right to tax royalties to the country of residence of the recipient
of the royalty payment and instead stipulates that the country of source may levy a
withholding tax on royalties. The UN model leaves the rate of withholding tax at
source on royalties to bilateral negotiations.

23

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, India, Israel, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of American comprised
the group of twenty countries. There were also several observing countries including Austria, Belgium,
Finland, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain, Swaziland and Venezuela and several
observing organizations including the International Monetary Fund, the International Fiscal Association,
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of American States,
and the International Chamber of Commerce.
24
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing
Countries, First Report, UN Doc E/4614 ST/ECA/110 (1969); Second Report, UN Doc E/4939
ST/ECA/137 (1970); Third Report, UN Doc ST/ECA/166 (1972); Fourth Report, UN Doc ST/ECA/188
(1973); Fifth Report, UN Doc ST/ESA/18 (1975); Sixth Report, UN Doc ST/ESA/42 (1976); Seventh
Report, UN Doc ST/ESA/79 (1978); Eighth Report, UN Doc ST/ESA/101 (1980).
25
Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, UN Doc ST/ESA/14
(1974). See also Stanley S Surrey, ‘United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax
Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries’ (1978) 19 Harvard International Law Journal
1.
26
Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries,
above n 19.
27
Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, UN Doc
ST/ESA/102 (1980). See S Surrey, ‘United Nations Model Convention for Tax Treaties Between
Developed and Developing Countries: A Description and Analysis’ in International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation, Selected Monographs on Taxation (1980) vol 5. The UN model convention was
updated most recently in 2001, see Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and
Developing Countries, UN publication no ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E21 (2001) [UN model convention].
28
See, eg, Sol Picciotto, International Business Taxation: A Study in the Internationalization of Business
Regulation (1992) 56. (“The UN Guidelines did not make any new departures in the approach to tax
treaties. They took as their starting point the 1963 OECD draft, and merely noted the differing views
expressed by experts….Neither the Guidelines, the Manual nor the Model Treaty could be said to
challenge the basic principles of the OECD model. Although the report of the UN experts stressed the
primacy of taxation at source, this was not expressed in any general principle.”)
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The fact that the OECD model convention reflects a strong residence country bias, and
hence can have adverse effects on the revenue of low-income countries, has been
noted by countless commentators.29 Given wide recognition of this obvious flaw, the
somewhat puzzling question is why it has remained the model for so many highincome countries even when negotiating with low-income countries. The presence of
the bias might be the product of some historically contingent set of facts; or, reflect a
careful and prudent weighing of all the tax, economic, and social factors relevant in
attempting to achieve a compromise beneficial to all affected parties; or, it might
conceivably simply reflect the self-interest of the most powerful participant in tax
treaty negotiations, the United States. This last possible explanation, that the United
States’ position in its treaty negotiations influences other countries’ negotiations (even
in the absence of the United States as a party to the particular treaty), was suggested
by Charles Irish in a leading article on the problems of tax treaties:
There appear to be several reasons for the emphasis on residence in tax
agreements between developed countries. Probably the fundamental reason
is that the emphasis on residence represents the more favorable alternative
for the country with the stronger bargaining position. Frequently countries
have an interest in capital, technology and services possessed by the
taxpayers of other countries. In such instances, the ‘interested’ country is the
potential source country and the other is the potential residence country. As
between the two countries, the potential residence country thus has the
stronger economic position and the evidence indicates that it has used its
superior position to ‘persuade’ the source country to forgo tax revenues so as
to insure availability of the desired capital, technology and services. This
apparently is what happened immediately after World War II between the
countries of Western Europe and the United States. At that time, the
Western European countries were very interested in attracting United States
capital and technology to rebuild and modernise their war-ravaged
economies. In order to ensure the unfettered flow of such capital and
technology into their economies, these countries accepted tax agreements
with the United States with a heavy emphasis on the residence principle.30

29

Recently, this point has been made perhaps most strongly by Lee Sheppard who comments that: “the
international system has been set up to preserve residence-based taxation by rich capital-exporting
countries at the expense of everyone else. Under the OECD model treaty, which rich countries impose
on others, whenever there is a conflict or a possibility of double taxation, the source country is required
to cede its primary right to tax. Originally intended to relieve double taxation, these treaties have
become instruments of double nontaxation all over the world, and everyone knows it.” ‘Revenge of the
Source Countries, Part IV: Who Gets the Bill?’ (2005) 40 Tax Notes International 411, 416. See also
Hope Ashiabor, ‘The Taxation of Foreign Investments in Developing Countries Under the Treaty
Regime: The African Experience’ (1996) 22(4) International Tax Journal 69; Avi-Yonah, “Bridging
the North/South Divide”, above n 9; Brown and Fellows, above n 8; Brown, above n 8; Tsilly Dagan,
‘The Tax Treaties Myth’ (2000) 32 International Law and Politics 939; H L Goldberg, ‘Conventions for
the Elimination of International Double Taxation: Toward a Developing Country Model’ (1983) 15 Law
& Policy in International Business 833; Charles Irish, ‘International Double Taxation Agreements and
Income Taxation at Source’ (1974) 23(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 292; Chang
Hee Lee, ‘Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue Between Developed and Developing
Countries’ (1999) 18 Tax Notes International 2569; Lee Sheppard, ‘Revenge of the Source Countries,
Part 2: Royalties’ (2005) 40 Tax Notes International 7; Stanley S Surrey, ‘United Nations Group of
Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries’ (1978) 19
Harvard International Law Journal 1.
30
Irish, ibid 294.
175

eJournal of Tax Research

Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries:
A Comparison of Canada and Australia’s Policies

Once low-income countries have conceded to the United States’ demands for a
primarily residence basis of taxation in their tax treaties with the United States, it then
becomes difficult not to provide those same terms in their negotiations with other
high-income countries. However, now that low-income countries are so desperate for
new technology from developed countries, and for an increased revenue base for
social and economic development, in negotiating treaties with them high-income
countries should ensure that the agreement they reach on the withholding on royalty
payments is in fact in the best interest of the low-income country.
C. The Significance of Royalty Payments
When one country transfers technology to another, the payments that are made in
return for the transfer to the exporting country might be characterized in a variety of
ways – as business profits, fees for services, rents, salaries, dividends, capital returns,
or royalties. Domestic tax rules and tax treaties treat each of these types of payments
differently. When a creator or inventor of property (normally intangible property)
transfers that property to a third party for use or reproduction of that property in some
fashion, the third party payment is generally characterized as a royalty. Royalty
payments might helpfully be classified into four broad types. First, there are payments
for the use of cultural property, including royalties for the use of a copyright of literary
or artistic work. Second, there are payments for the use of intangible industrial
property; for example, payments for the use or reproduction of industrial, commercial,
or scientific experience (“know how”), or patents, designs, secret processes and
formulas, trademarks, and similar property. Third, there are payments for the use of
tangible property; for example, payments for the use of natural resource properties or
for industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment. Finally, in at least some
circumstances, royalties include payments for technical assistance associated with any
of the above types of royalties (“show how”).31
Residents of high-income countries naturally are much more likely to produce
property giving rise to royalty income than residents of low-income countries.32 The
Human Development Report supplies statistics on the number of patents granted to
residents and of the receipts of royalties and license fees for the 177 countries it tracks.
In 2002, residents of countries with high human development were granted an average
of 250 patents per million people, in contrast with the average of seven patents per
million people granted in medium human development countries, and no patents in
low human development countries. Naturally, similar disparities are observed in the
receipt of royalties and license fees. In 2003, in high human development countries on
average approximately $80 per person was received from royalties and license fees,
while in medium human development countries only 30 cents was received per

31

The OECD model convention defines royalties as “…payments of any kind received as a consideration
for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, including
cinematograph films, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for
information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.” OECD model convention,
above n 5, art 12.2. For a detailed history of the evolution of the definition of “royalty” in the Canadian
tax context see Duncan Osborne, ‘Revisiting Royalties in the Age of Electronic Commerce’ (1999)
47(2) Canadian Tax Journal 410, 410–455.
32
The five leading research economies are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom. Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, ‘Trade in Ideas: Patenting and Productivity in the
OECD’ (1996) 40 Journal of International Economics 251, 252.
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person, and no royalties were received by persons in low human development
countries.33
Although the privileging of residence-based taxation of royalty payments has always
been unfair to source countries, that unfairness has been exacerbated by two trends
over the last forty years. First, due to a number of factors the value of royalty
payments has grown significantly: the upsurge in reliance on outsourcing (and the
related transfer of technical knowledge); the dramatic increase in the use of
computers, computer processes and software, which are transferred to almost every
jurisdiction where an enterprise carries on operations; and, the increased ease with
which intangible property giving rise to royalty payments may be relocated anywhere
in the world. Second, the increasing ease of characterizing the consideration for the
transfer of property and services as a royalty payment exacerbates the ability of source
countries to collect their fair share of tax revenue. The income from sales of books, to
take an obvious example, has traditionally been characterized as income from
business; however, if the book is transferred digitally, the income could conceivably
be characterized as a royalty. The characterization of income payments has plagued
the drafters of the OECD model treaty and commentators who have struggled with
drawing clear lines between business income and royalty payments, but there is little
doubt that an increasing number of payments take, or can be modified to take, the
form of royalties in order to gain a tax advantage.
Despite both an increasing number of cross-border royalty payments from low-income
countries and a growing consensus in development economics that low-income
countries urgently require mechanisms for self-directed development, and an increased
number of cross-border royalty payments, the OECD has not amended its tax treaty
position against the imposition of a royalty withholding tax. Although in 1963 the
failure to grant source jurisdictions the right to tax royalty payments may not have
resulted in a large loss of revenue to low-income countries, and may thus have been a
sensible concession to administrative considerations, given the changing nature of
world trade and investment the attachment of the OECD to the residence-only taxation
of royalty payments has become increasingly unacceptable.
II. ALLOCATING REVENUES THROUGH THE ROYALTY ARTICLE IN TAX TREATIES
Both Canada and Australia have entered into a substantial number of treaties with
low-income countries, as shown in Appendix A. Canada has entered into 88 tax
treaties and Australia has entered into 42. Of Canada’s 88 tax treaties, 53 (or just over
60%) have been negotiated with low-income countries (countries where the GDP per
34
capita is below $12,500 (US) per person). Australia has negotiated fewer tax treaties
with low income countries – only 17 of its tax treaties (or just over 40%) have been
negotiated with low-income countries.
33

UNDR, above n 1, table 13.
Although a number of organizations, including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund, have classified countries as developing or developed using a variety of
criteria, for the purposes of this paper, I used a relatively simple approach. If the country had GDP per
capital in excess of $12,500 per year (US, PPP), it was classified as high-income; if the GDP per capita
was below $12,500 it was classified as low-income. This is an admittedly rough method of classifying
jurisdictions; however, gross domestic product per capita seemed like a sensible measure of economic
impoverishment since my argument is that Canada (and other high-income countries) should provide for
a more just allocation of tax revenues by permitting low-income countries to take a larger portion of
those revenues.
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This part reviews the role and effect of the royalties article in tax treaties, and
compares Canada and Australia’s tax treaties. Four aspects of the royalties article are
examined in particular. Section A discusses the importance of taxing royalties at
source. Contrary to the OECD model convention, both Canada and Australia allow
for the imposition of a withholding tax on royalties at source in their tax treaties. This
section argues they should continue to do so. Section B argues that a higher rate of
withholding is appropriate where a party to the tax treaty is a low-income country.
Both Canada and Australia have granted higher withholding tax rates to some of their
low-income treaty partners. In a few instances Canada has granted non-reciprocal
treatment to low-income countries and allowed them to impose a higher withholding
tax rate than Canada agrees to impose. Section C reviews the characterization
difficulties that arise when royalty payments are taxed differently from business
profits and services. Despite the difficulties inherent in distinguishing income from
business and services income from income from property (here, royalties), that
distinction should be maintained, and, indeed, the scope of the royalties provision
broadened. Section D examines the exclusion of, or reduction in, the withholding tax
rate for particular types of royalty payments. This section argues that there should be
no exemptions from, or reduced rates for, royalty taxation at source. Canada has
negotiated a large number of exemptions or reductions for royalty payments in its tax
treaties with low-income countries. In stark contrast, Australia has not negotiated any
exemptions from withholding for royalty payments from low-income countries, and
has negotiated only a small number of reductions in the standard withholding rate.
A. Low-Income Countries Should be Permitted by Treaty to Tax Royalty
Payments at Source
One of the most significant differences between the OECD and UN model
conventions is the position each convention takes on the right of source jurisdictions
to tax royalties. As noted above, although the OECD model convention provides for
both residence and source taxation when property income in the form of interest or
dividends is paid, for royalty payments only the residence country is granted
jurisdiction to tax royalties.35 The UN model convention, in contrast, permits both
residence and source-based taxation of royalty payments.36 The OECD and those who
support its position have marshalled four arguments in favour of exclusive residencebased taxation of royalty payments, which mirror the arguments in favour of exclusive
residence-based taxation more generally. However, they are insufficient to justify
depriving low-income countries of a share of the tax revenues associated with the use
of property giving rise to royalty income in the low-income country.
First, it is argued that the residence country has a principled claim to tax income from
royalties because of the economic nexus between the owners of the property giving
rise to the royalties and their country of residence and other the normative values
underlying an income tax. This argument is based largely on three considerations:
first, since the owners of the property giving rise to the royalty have invested the time
and expense of developing the intangibles in the residence state, that state has an
economic connection to the income; second, because the residence state can require
individuals (this argument does not apply equally to corporations) to total their income
from all sources, the residence state alone can impose tax based on taxpayer’s ability

35
36

OECD model convention, above n 5, art 12.1.
UN model convention, above n 27, art 12.1.
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to pay; and finally, the taxation of worldwide income in the state of residence
preserves capital export neutrality, which means that taxpayers will be tax-indifferent
between exploiting their property for the purpose of earning royalty income in their
home jurisdiction or in another jurisdiction.37 However, at best these are arguments
for preserving some ability of the residence country to tax royalties, and not a
justification for exclusive jurisdiction.38 Indeed, based on economic nexus, the source
country has an arguably stronger claim to tax the revenues produced by the use of the
royalty-producing property. The income arose from the property’s use in that
jurisdiction, so there is an obvious economic connection to the source state. The
benefits provided by the source state are significant. On a general level, the source
country provides the benefit of infrastructure, including communications (ecommerce) infrastructure, and the right to incorporate separate legal entities.39 In
addition, the source state may provide a well-educated, highly-skilled workforce that
can be employed in the technology sector. It will, as well, provide an orderly market
place for the taxpayer to exploit.40 More specifically in the context of royalty
payments, where the property that gives rise to the income is an intangible, the
intellectual property protections provided by the source country dwarf in significance
those provided by the residence state.41 Moreover, where the source state is a lowincome country, the ability to tax the royalty income at source might be seen as one
way of compensating low-income countries for complying with the intellectual
property regimes imposed by high-income countries.42
Finally, since many

37

The argument that residence-based taxation is necessary to support capital export neutrality is less
strong in the context of non-rivalrous intangible property in particular since its owner does not need to
make a choice between using the technology at home or abroad as the same technology can be used in
both places. See Eric Laity, ‘The Competence of Nations and International Tax Law’ (draft on file with
the author) 28.
38
Some commentators, eg, Klaus Vogel, have argued that ideally royalties should be taxed in both the
source and residence state as a way of preserving neutrality and equity. Vogel argues that to be
perfectly neutral the “interest” component of a royalty payment should be taxed at the place of residence
of the lessee/user, while the “sales price” (the amortization of the underlying right) and the risk
(services) portions of the royalty payment should be taxable in the state of residence. Accepting the
practical limits of unbundling a royalty payment into its three component parts, Vogel proposes that a
fixed share of the payment should be taxable by both the residence and source states (¼ to the state of
residence, and ¾ to the state of source); a solution that is similar to that proposed in this paper. Vogel,
‘Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments’ (Pt 2) (1988) 10
Intertax 310, 317–318; and ‘Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of
arguments’ (Pt 3) (1988) 11 Intertax 393, 402.
39
One of the fundamental justifications for the formation of multinational enterprises is the benefit of
sharing intangibles. Businesses may have concerns that they are unable to secure adequate protections
for their intangible property through the use of contracts between unrelated parties, and therefore, they
choose instead to establish a foreign enterprise over which they exercise a significant degree of control.
Therefore, the source state’s protection of that separate entity has significant value to the intangible’s
owner. See generally Oliver E Williamson and Sidney G Winter (eds), The Nature of the Firm:
Origins, Evolution, and Development (1991), and Bengt Holstrom and Jean Tirole, ‘Transfer Pricing
and Organizational Form’ (1991) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 201.
40
See, Stephen Shay, J Clifton Fleming Jr and Robert Peroni, ‘”What’s Source Got to Do With It?”
Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation’ (2002) 56 Tax Law Review 81, 93–95.
41
Lawrence Lokken, ‘The Sources of Income from International Uses and Dispositions of Intellectual
Property’ (1981) 36 Tax Law Review 235, 240–241. (“The laws and legal system at the place of use
constitute, in sum, the governmental services and protections of greatest consequence for royalty
income.”)
42
See Frederick Abbott, ‘Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of Trips and Variable
Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 77;
Ruth Mayne, ‘Regionalism, Bilateralism, and “TRIP Plus” Agreements: The Treat to Developing
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intangibles are unique, it might also be assumed that their owners are earning
economic rents in source jurisdictions and that as a consequence the source country
has a legitimate claim to recoup at least part of these economic rents.43
Second, it is argued by those who support the OECD position that the country of
residence is better able to design a tax regime that accurately reflects the expenses
associated with the production of intangibles and other property that gives rise to
royalties and therefore is better able to tax the real income associated with the use of
those intangibles. Since royalty payments are necessarily taxed at source through the
imposition of a withholding tax on the gross payment, no account is taken of the
expenses associated with the production of the royalty property. However, this
argument is insufficient to justify failing to impose a withholding tax at source. In
many cases where royalty property is transferred to a low-income country there will
be few expenses associated with its use. Often, intangible property like patents and
processes are licensed in low-income countries only after their value has been fully
recouped in high-income countries.44 If their costs are not yet fully recouped in the
residence country, because intangibles are generally non-rivalrous, it is likely that few,
if any, additional costs are incurred when they are transferred for use in another
jurisdiction. Finally, even if there are expenses associated with the production of
property giving rise to royalty income in low-income jurisdictions, the need to
recognize those expenses is not sufficient to justify non-taxation of royalty income at
source. The rate of withholding will be set lower than otherwise would be the case
since it is being levied on a gross payment and not net revenue. Interest and dividend
payments are subject to withholding tax under the OECD model convention, generally
at rates of 10 percent and 15 percent respectively. It is not clear why the need to
recognize expenses would support a position of no source-based taxation of royalty
payments, and yet the difficulty of setting a withholding tax rate that recognizes
expenses associated with the production of interest and dividend payments would not
be seen to be similarly intractable.
As an alternative to setting a low withholding tax rate on gross royalty income that
would act as a proxy for a higher rate on net royalty income, source countries could
permit investors to make a net basis election that would allow them to pay tax in the
source country on the basis of their net royalty profits.45 As another admittedly
unlikely alternative, if high-income countries were committed to supporting the
revenue-raising goals of low-income countries, and were also committed to ensuring
the correct taxation of income, high-income countries could undertake to refund any
overpayment of tax in the source country to residence taxpayers. This refund would

Countries’ (2005) UNDP Occasional Paper. I am indebted to Donatella Alessandrini at Kent University
Law School for this point.
43
These arguments in their generic form are frequently discussed as arguments based on economic
allegiance, benefit, and entitlement. See Charles E McLure Jr, ‘Source-Based Taxation and Alternatives
to the Concept of Permanent Establishment’ in Report of Proceedings of the First World Tax
Conference: Taxes Without Borders (2000).
44
See paragraph 6 of the commentary to the UN model convention. In paragraph 7 of the UN model
convention, developed countries reply that it is not true that valuable intangibles are transferred to
developing countries only after they have been fully exploited by developed ones. See UN model
convention, above n 27, commentary paragraphs 6 and 7.
45
Some countries permit a net basis election for rent payments made to non-residents; see, eg, s 216 of
the Canadian Income Tax Act, RSC 1985 (5th Supp), c 1, s 216. See also Richard Doernberg,
‘Electronic Commerce and International Tax Sharing’ (1998) 16 Tax Notes International 1013.
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amount to a tax expenditure by high-income countries, designed to support investment
in low-income countries.
Third, exclusive residence-based taxation is sometimes justified on the ground of
administrative ease. Administrative justifications for residence-only taxation fall into
four categories: first, the difficulty of determining the geographical location of the
property that gives rise to the royalty; second, the risk of tax avoidance that arises
because of the ease with which intangibles are (re)located; third, the inability of source
countries to administer a withholding tax on royalty payments; and fourth, the
additional tax compliance costs that withholding taxes impose on inventors and
creators of royalty property.
An obvious administrative difficulty of imposing a withholding tax on royalties is
determining their geographical source.46 Historically, the geographic source of a
royalty payment has been the location where the royalty is used.47 This test makes
sense because presumably the role of a test for determining the geographic location of
a royalty is to operationalize the purpose of permitting the source country to tax the
income – namely, to reflect the economic connection of the source state to the income,
to compensate the source state for the benefits it provides that relate to the income
produced, and to allow the source state to capture some of the economic rent.48 Given
that intellectual property can be used at the place where, for example, the goods that
rely on the patent are manufactured, where those goods are sold, or where those goods
are consumed, the subsidiary question is always where is the place of use of intangible
property? The place of use should be the place where the protections offered by the
government are the most important to the income-earning process, generally the place
of sale.49
Despite the alignment of a place of use rule with the objectives of allocating at least
some tax revenue to the state that provides the protections critical to the income
production, the explosion of e-commerce, and other forms of electronic
communications, have made it much easier to move intangible assets and much more
difficult to pinpoint the geographical use.50 Therefore, while the place of use rule
seems sensibly aligned with the purpose of permitting the source jurisdiction to tax the
royalty income (because presumably the place where the royalty is used is the place

46

For a review of the Canadian judicial decisions on the geographic source of royalty payments see Neal
Armstrong, ‘Exploiting the Unique Features of Intellectual Property’ in R&D Credits Today, Innovation
Tomorrow, 1999 Corporate Management Tax Conference (1999) 9:1.
47
For a comparison of the domestic and treaty geographic source rules for royalties (and other types of
payments) in Canada, the United States, and Mexico see Michael Schadewald and Tracy Kaye, ‘A Look
at the Source of Income Rules and Treaty Relief from Double Taxation with the NAFTA Trading Bloc’
(2000) 21 Tax Notes International 1063.
48
See Shay et al, above n 42, 139. Although Shay et al justify source taxation on the basis that it
provides a means of imposing a market access charge, they make the important point that there is no
normative content to a geographic source rule – instead, the rule should simply support the purpose of
imposing the source rule in the first place (“…we submit that U.S. source taxation should be justified
under the market access charge rationale explained [above], that its scope should be determined under
the principles articulated [above], and that the income source rules should be articulated for the limited
purpose of implementing those principles.”).
49
See Lokken, above n 39, 277–282.
50
There is a large literature on the difficulty of determining the geographic source of a payment for the
use of intangible property. For a recent contribution to this literature, see Erin Guruli, ‘International
Taxation: Application of Source Rules to Income from Intangible Property’ (2005) 5 Houston Business
and Tax Law Journal 204.
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where the intellectual property protections matter and so on), enforceability concerns
suggest that a secondary test may also be necessary. For example, the UN model
convention provides that the geographic source of a royalty is the residence of its
payer, unless the person paying the royalties has a fixed base or permanent
establishment that bears the cost of the royalties, in which case the royalties are
deemed to arise in the state where the fixed base or permanent establishment is
located.51 While the place of the payer does not line up with the purpose of imposing
the source tax as closely as the place of use test does, as a secondary test it supports
the enforceability of a withholding tax.
A workable test for the source of a royalty payment would appear to require tax
treaties to include a three-prong geographic source rule. First, royalties should have
their geographic source in the place of use of the underlying property. Second, in the
event that the place of use cannot be determined, the residence of the payer should
determine the geographic source of the royalty. Finally, where neither the place of use
nor residence of the payer can be determined, competent authorities should provide a
decision on the royalty’s geographic source. This default to competent authority is
increasingly necessary given that residency, as the alternative to source rules, does not
provide a simple manipulation-free means of determining geographic source – the
residence of corporations, for example, is in many cases easier to manipulate than the
source of income.52 However, in the context of low-income countries, the place of use
should generally be sufficient because the problem of determining the geographic
source of royalties is likely not as difficult as locating the place of use in high-income
countries given that intangible property transferred to low-income countries is much
more likely to be manufacturing and other intangibles that are related to use in specific
physical places than intangibles that are completely disconnected from any physical
source. Neither Canada nor Australia have included a “place of use” test for
geographic source in their tax treaties, relying instead on a residence of the payer test.
The only exception to this practice for both countries is in their tax treaties with the
United States, which includes a residence of the payer test as a primary test, but with a
place of use test as a secondary test.53
A second administrative difficulty with the imposition of a withholding tax on royalty
payments is the creation of avoidance and evasion opportunities. The location of
intangible property in many cases is easily manipulated; however, as argued above, an
enforceable source rule for royalties is possible. Moreover, source-based taxation may
assist in combating abusive schemes. The non-taxation of royalty payments at source
creates additional incentives for taxpayers to avoid taxation by inflating the royalty
payments received from a particular jurisdiction. Where royalty payments are not

51

UN model convention, above n 27, 12.5.
See the discussion in Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ (1997) 52
Tax Law Review 507, 520, 527; McLure, above n 42, 6:7–6:8; Angel Schindel and Adolfo Atchabahian,
‘General Report’ in Source and Residence: New Configuration of Their Principles (2005) vol. 90a, 30–
31; John Sweet, ‘Formulating International Tax Laws in the Age of Electronic Commerce: The Possible
Ascendancy of Residence-Based Taxation in an Era of Eroding Traditional Income Tax Principles’
(1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1949, 1993.
53
The 1995 protocol to the Canada-United States Tax Convention altered the geographic source of a
royalty payment from its place of use to the location of the payer. For a discussion of the 1995 protocol
amendments to the royalty article of the Canada-United States Tax Convention see Catherine Brown,
‘The 1995 Canada-US Protocol: The Scope of the New Royalty Provisions’ (1995) 43(3) Canadian Tax
Journal 592.
52

182

eJournal of Tax Research

Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries:
A Comparison of Canada and Australia’s Policies

subject to tax, but payments characterized as from another source (for example,
business profits) are subject to tax, taxpayers will seek either to recharacterize their
cross-border payments as royalty payments to access the tax exemption or increase the
value assigned to the royalty property so that larger royalty payments can be made taxfree.54 Unduly large royalty payments may particularly be a problem for low-income
countries that lack transfer pricing rules, or the ability to enforce those rules.55
Unjustifiably increasing royalty payments may be particularly appealing if the royalty
payment were not subject to tax in the residence country either, say, because the
residence-country parent company was non-taxable or had losses.56 In addition,
source-based taxation combined with residence-based taxation means that two
jurisdictions’ taxing authorities have an incentive to attempt to track and tax the
transfer of property giving rise to royalty payments. Permitting the taxation of
royalties at source also increases the value to low-income (or source countries) of
entering into robust exchange of information agreements with high-income countries.
Third, the non-taxation of royalty payments at source has been justified on the
administrative ground that low-income countries do not have sufficiently sophisticated
tax administration to appropriately enforce and collect the withholding tax. The short
answer to this objection is, of course, that high-income countries should assist lowincome countries in enforcing their tax rules. But at the every least, one incidental
benefit of joint taxation by source and residence countries might be increased
communication between taxing authorities, which may assist with the transfer of tax
administration knowledge and experience from high-income to low-income countries
and facilitate stronger tax administrations in low-income countries.57
The last administrative argument sometimes used to justify the non-taxation of royalty
payments at source is that withholding taxes increase the compliance costs of making
transnational investments and therefore discourage international trade and investment.
But, this argument applies to all taxes levied by source countries; if source countries
levy taxes, in addition to complying with the tax rules in its residence country an
investor making a transnational investment must also comply with the tax rules of the
source country. In most cases the costs of complying with source country taxes will
be a small percentage of the additional costs of exporting or doing business abroad. In

54

One could reply that the transfer pricing rules would operate to reduce the payment to one that arm’s
length parties would agree to; however, the transfer pricing rules are notoriously hard to apply to
intangible transfers. See the discussion of this issue in United Nations, Taxation of Technology
Transfer: Key Issues (2005) 23.
55
Jeff Ngoy, ‘International Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2001) 24 Tax Notes International 275.
56
This reason for imposing a withholding tax on royalties is commonly acknowledged by commentators.
In her report on the September 2005 International Fiscal Association meetings in Buenos Aires, Lee
Sheppard, in noting that the OECD model convention imposes no withholding tax on royalties, quips,
“With the prevalence of intangibles exported from developed countries, royalties are becoming a sore
point for market countries. Eight percent of royalty payments worldwide are made between related
companies, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Income stripping,
anyone? That is the chief concern of host countries, for obvious reasons.” Sheppard (Pt 2), above n 29,
8.
57
Tax administrators and tax reformers have been critiqued for failing to take the differences in social and
economic context between developed and developing countries seriously when tax administration
strategies that work well in developed countries are exported. These critiques suggest that locationspecific tax administration approaches ought to be developed. See Miranda Stewart, ‘Global
Trajectories of Tax Reform: Mapping Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries’ (2003) 44
Harvard International Law Journal 140.
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any event, flat-rate withholding taxes on gross receipts that are withheld by the payor
in the source country are the simplest taxes to calculate and pay.
The final argument raised by high-income countries in support of residence-only
taxation of royalty payments is that it is important to exempt royalty payments from
source taxation to facilitate the transfer of technology from suppliers in high-tax
countries to users in low-tax countries. The argument rests upon a premise that is
similar to the premise of the argument frequently made for the non-taxation of interest
payments that flow from persons in source countries to investors resident in another
country, namely, that if withholding taxes are imposed on royalties, the licensor will
demand that they be paid by the licensee in the source country. Either the licensor
will insist that the royalty be paid net of the taxes or the royalty payment will simply
be required to be grossed-up to account for the withholding taxes. In either case, the
withholding tax will be effectively paid by the licensee in the source country. Hence,
the effect of the withholding tax will be to act as a duty on imported technology,
raising the price of technology to source country licensees.
However, for two reasons the incidence of the withholding tax is unlikely to fall on the
licensee. First, in most cases the licensor will be able to completely offset the
withholding tax against its income tax liability in its residence jurisdiction through the
use of the foreign tax credit.58 Indeed, where this is the case, if the source country
does not impose a withholding tax on the royalty payment it will simply amount to a
transfer from the low-income country’s treasury to the high-income country’s
treasury.
Second, there might be some cases where the licensor will not be able to offset the
withholding tax against its residence jurisdiction’s income tax, either because it is
diverting the royalty payment to a tax haven jurisdiction where it will not bear tax
liability (or it is evading paying tax on this income) or the withholding tax exceeds the
tax credit available in the resident country. However, even in these cases the licensee
might not bear the withholding tax. Rates of interest are generally set in international
markets and because so many countries do not impose withholding taxes on them, and
because international flows of interest are often not subject to income tax in the hands
of the investor, it is generally accepted to be the case that a withholding tax on interest
must be born by the borrower.59 However, much of the property that gives rise to
royalty payments is unique, and it must be transferred to specific markets to be
exploited. Therefore, for the transfer of the types of property on which royalties are
generally paid, one might reasonably assume that the payor of the royalty has
increased bargaining power, and, where the foreign tax credit is incomplete, may be
able to negotiate to pay less or none of the withholding tax.

58

Of course, even if the withholding tax is creditable in the resident country there may be a cost to the
imposition of a withholding tax because the withholding tax is likely to be due at the time payment is
made and the income tax payable in the resident country might not be due until some later date.
Therefore, given the time value of money, withholding taxes may impose some small additional cost on
non-resident investors. See Irish, above n 29, 304.
59
It might be noted, however, that within the EU member states, EU Council Directive 2003/49/EC as
modified by 2004/76/EC requires that interest and royalty payments between European Union members
not be subject to withholding tax at source. This may put increased pressure on non-EU member states
to follow suit and to reduce or remove withholding taxes on royalty payments. The latest states to join
the EU have been granted a transition period in which to remove their current withholding taxes.
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Indeed, the effect of the position of high-income countries that low-income countries
should sacrifice source taxation in the name of greater ease of trade has perhaps
ironically led to the reverse result. High-income countries ostensibly seek to enter into
tax treaty negotiations to facilitate international trade and investment. Yet, if highincome countries insist on terms, including that royalty payments be exempt from
source taxation, that are unacceptable to many low-income countries the number of
treaties entered into between high- and low-income countries will remain low and
hence international trade and investment diminished.
B. Withholding Tax Rates Should be Sufficiently High that Low-Income
Countries Receive their Fair Share of Tax Revenue
If it is accepted that source countries should be able to retain the right to impose a
withholding tax on royalty income, the appropriate rate of withholding must be
determined.60 In setting that rate a number of factors must be considered. First, the
rate is being applied to the gross royalty payment; therefore, since the withholding tax
is meant to be a tax on the taxpayer’s net income, the rate should be lower than the
rate that the source country would apply directly to the taxpayer’s net income. But, as
suggested above, in fact in many cases there are likely to be few expenses associated
with earning the royalty payment in the source country thus the rate might not have to
be reduced too greatly on this account. Second, the rate should not be set so high that
it will discourage technology transfers into the source country. Third, the rate should
be set at a percentage that ensures there is little incentive for taxpayers to attempt to
characterize other sources of income as royalty payments in order to avoid taxes.
Finally, the source country should consider the strength of its normative claim for
imposing taxes on royalty payments earned within its jurisdiction. These criteria
might suggest different rates for different types of royalty payments. For example,
they might suggest that withholding tax rates should be the highest for royalty
payments derived from the use of natural resources located in a source jurisdiction. In
fact, both the OECD and UN model conventions treat income from immovable
property in a separate Article (Article 6) and both conventions permit taxation of that
property at source.
The UN model convention does not prescribe an appropriate withholding tax rate for
royalty payments (nor for other types of income from property such as interest and
dividend income). Instead the Group of Experts suggested that the applicable rate of
withholding should be left to the negotiators of particular tax treaties and that
considerations such as those mentioned above should be taken into account, in
addition to the source country’s need for revenue and the fiscal inequity of the two
negotiating parties.61
The withholding tax rates on royalties permitted by each of Canada and Australia’s tax
treaties are set out in Appendix A. In Canada’s tax treaties, the usual rate of
withholding on royalty payments is 10 percent, occasionally it is 15 percent, and in a
small number of cases it is greater than 15 percent. It is slightly more likely that a rate
higher than 10 percent will be negotiated with a low-income country than with a high-
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For a discussion of a range of considerations that might be taken into account in setting a withholding
tax rate in the e-commerce context, including some illustrations of the effects of particular rates on
profits see Richard Doernberg et al, Electronic Commerce and Multijurisdictional Taxation (2001) 359,
359–363.
61
See paragraphs 8 and 9 of the commentary to the UN model convention.
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income country. In Canada’s 35 treaties with high-income countries the rate is 10
percent in 31 treaties, in the remaining four treaties (Israel, Korea, New Zealand, and
Singapore) it is 15 percent. In Canada’s 53 treaties with low-income countries, the
rate is 10 percent in 32 treaties, 12.5 percent in one (Nigeria) 15 percent in 15, 18
percent in one (Dominican Republic), 20 percent in one (Tanzania), and nonreciprocal in three (Cameroon, Pakistan, and Philippines). Thus in approximately 11
percent of its tax treaties with high-income countries Canada negotiated a rate higher
than 10 percent while in almost 40 percent of its treaties with low-income countries it
negotiated a rate higher than 10 percent.
In Australia’s tax treaties, as well, the usual rate of withholding on royalty payments is
10 percent. In 21 of its 25 treaties with high-income countries the rate of withholding
is 10. In two of its treaties with high-income countries the rate is only 5 percent (the
United Kingdom and the United States), and in one it is 12.5 percent (Taiwan). In its
17 treaties with low-income countries, the rate is 10 percent in nine treaties, 15 percent
in seven treaties, and 25 percent in one treaty (Philippines). Thus Australia has
negotiated a rate in excess of 10 percent in eight percent of its treaties with highincome countries, while in approximately 47 percent of its treaties with low-income
countries the rate is above 10 percent. By this measure, it would appear that Australia
and Canada have been roughly equally likely to enter into treaties with low-income
countries that have withholding tax rates in excess of 10 percent.
On its face, one of the most progressive steps a country can take in allocating tax
revenues to low-income countries is to allow the low-income country to impose a
higher withholding tax on payments with a source in its jurisdiction than the highincome country imposes on payments with a source in its jurisdiction. Australia has
not negotiated any non-reciprocal withholding tax rates for royalty income. Canada,
however, has entered into three tax treaties with low-income countries that permit
those countries to impose a higher withholding tax on royalties than Canada does.
Cameroon (15 percent Canada / 20 percent Cameroon), Pakistan (15 percent Canada /
20 percent Pakistan), and the Philippines (15 percent Canada / 25 percent Philippines).
It is not entirely clear why Canada agreed to these nonreciprocal rates and it is
interesting that they have not done so in any recent treaties with low-income
countries.62 These three treaties were signed in 1982 (Cameroon), and 1976 (Pakistan
and Philippines).
Although agreeing to nonreciprocal rates might appear to be
generous on the part of the high-income country, since there are likely to be so few, if
any, flows of royalty payments from high-income countries to low-income countries,
the rate imposed by the high-income country is likely in most cases to be irrelevant.
Certainly the revenue implications of the high-income country reducing the rate would
be utterly trivial to it and would not likely result in much, if any, additional revenue to
the low-income country.
C. Tax Treaties Should Give Broad Scope to the Meaning of Royalty
When a business simply sells ordinary goods in a source country, goods that have
been perhaps ordered through the mail, traditionally it has been held that the source
country does not have a sufficient basis for taxing the business on the profits that it
might earn in the source country. All tax treaties provide that businesses are exempt
from tax in the source country unless they have a permanent establishment in the
62

Although in its treaty with Senegal, signed in 2001, Canada agreed to non-reciprocal rates of
withholding for dividend and interest payments.
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country. Permanent establishment is defined differently in treaties, but basically it
includes any fixed (and physical) presence in a country; for example, an enterprise is
generally held to have a permanent establishment in a jurisdiction where it has a place
of management, branch, office, factory, or workshop, or a place of extraction of
natural resources, or a construction or installation project that lasts for an extended
period of time. Most treaties remove from the definition of permanent establishment
casual or temporary business activities.
If the taxpayer is earning a royalty in the source country, as argued above, the source
country should be entitled to impose a withholding tax on the gross royalty payment
(in lieu of imposing an income tax on the net royalty profits earned in the source
country). But, if the income earned in the source country can be characterized as
income from a business (and not a royalty) then it will not be subject to source
taxation unless the taxpayer has a permanent establishment in the source country.
Accepting, in principle, (as all tax treaties do) that the source country does not have a
legitimate claim for taxing businesses that are simply selling ordinary products in the
country (unless the business has a permanent establishment in the country), but does
have a legitimate claim for taxing royalty payments received by a non-resident
taxpayer that has a source in the country (whether or not the taxpayer has a permanent
establishment in the country), the question remains as to whether it is possible to
conceptually and practically distinguish between royalties and business income.
Some commentators have argued that one justification for not allowing source
countries to impose a withholding tax on royalty payments is that the distinction
between royalties and business income is simply too tenuous in principle and
impossible to make in practice. Above I have argued that the owner of royalty
payments derives a sufficient benefit from or owes a sufficient economic allegiance to
the source country that it can justifiably tax the payment. Here I will briefly deal with
the question of whether it is practicable to distinguish between royalty payments,
business profits, and services income.
There is no question that with the advent of electronic commerce the distinction
between royalties, business profits, and payments for related services has become
more difficult to make.63 Various roundtable discussions where commentators have
discussed how they would characterize payments reveals that tax experts are
frequently split on the appropriate approach to characterization issues.64 This has been
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For a discussion of the issues that arise in characterizing income in the e-commerce context as business
income or royalty income, see Catherine Brown, ‘The Canadian Income Tax Treatment of Computer
Software Payments’ (1994) 42 Canadian Tax Journal 593; Arthur Cockfield, ‘Balancing National
Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ (1999) 74 Tulane Law Review 133; Richard
Doernberg, ‘Electronic Commerce: Changing Income Tax Treaty Principles A Bit?’ (2000) 21 Tax
Notes International 2417; Aldo Forgione, ‘Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in
the Digital Age’ (2003) 26 Seattle University Law Review 719; Jinyan Li, International Taxation in the
Age of Electronic Commerce: A Comparative Study (2003) 420, 420–444; Niv Tadmore, ‘Further
Discussion on Income Characterization’ (2004) 52(1) Canadian Tax Journal 124, 124–140. For a
discussion of the difficulties of line drawing between business and investment income more generally
see, eg, John F Avery Jones et al, ‘Treaty Conflicts in Categorizing Income as Business Profits:
Differences in Approach Between Common Law and Civil Law Countries’ in Brian Arnold et al (eds),
The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties (2003).
64
For example, at the 2005 International Fiscal Association Congress in Buenos Aires several panel
members discussed whether particular payments in four different cases would appropriately be
considered to be “royalties” given the definition of royalties in the OECD model convention. In each of
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widely recognized and several studies have been undertaken in an attempt to develop
guidelines to assist in distinguishing between the two types of payments. Indeed,
where there is any uncertainty in the appropriate characterization of payments, perhaps
not surprisingly, high-income countries tend to be biased in favour of characterizing
the payments as business profits. For example, in a recent examination of the
characterization of 28 e-commerce transactions, an OECD working group determined
that only three of the transactions were royalties, while the rest of the transactions
gave rise to business profits.65 In contrast, an Indian Ministry of Finance report
concluded that in 14 of the 28 transaction examples provided, the transaction
described gave rise to a royalty.66
Several commentators have proposed solutions to the difficulty of distinguishing
between types of income, particularly focused on the e-commerce context. For
example, Reuven Avi-Yonah proposes eradicating the differential treatment of
services, royalties, rents, and business profits, and considering all electronic commerce
payments as active business income subject to a withholding tax regime based on
gross sales into a jurisdiction.67 Arthur Cockfield similarly proposes that servers and
other minor physical e-commerce related hardware not be considered a permanent
establishment in the source state, but that all cross-border transfers of e-commerce
goods, services, and capital that pass a threshold value of, for example, $1 million, be
subject to a low withholding tax rate of, say, 5 percent, thereby leaving at least some
revenue in the hands of source countries.68
A solution in the tax treaty context might simply be to draft a decision-rule that
provides a preference for royalty treatment where a withholding tax on royalty
payments is imposed. This rule in tax treaties would characterize any payment based
on production or use as a royalty; any payment arising from activities that are highly
substitutable with those kinds of payments as royalties; and any payments that are
difficult to unbundle, but that include a royalty payment, to be royalties for the
those cases the panel members differed about whether particular payments were properly royalties,
business profits, capital gains, or payments for services. See Catherine Bobbett and John Avery Jones,
‘The Treaty Definition of Royalties’ 60(1) Bulletin for International Taxation 23. See also Sheppard,
(Pt 2), above n 29, 8–11; and Brian Arnold, Jacques Sasseville and Eric Zolt, ‘Summary of the
Proceedings of an Invitational Seminar on Tax Treaties in the 21st Century’ (2002) 50(1) Canadian Tax
Journal 65, 81. (“One real-life example…was the use of a non-resident-owned satellite by the domestic
television network of a developing country. Because the non-resident did not have a PE in the
developing country, that country could not tax the non-resident’s business profits. However, by
characterizing the payment for the use of the satellite as rent or royalty, the developing country levied a
gross basis withholding tax, which was excessive having regard to the amount of net income derived by
the non-resident.”).
65
OECD, Tax Treaty Characterisation Issues Arising from E-Commerce: Report to Working Party No. 1
of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (1 February 2001), Annex II. For a discussion of the report,
see Wright Schickli, ‘Characterization of E-Commerce Revenue – The Final OECD Report Revealed’
(2001) 22 Tax Notes International 1671.
66
India, Report of the High Powered Committee on Electronic Commerce and Taxation (2001), Annex 2.
67
Avi Yonah, “Electronic Commerce”, above n 54, 541–545.
68
See Arthur Cockfield, ‘Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business
Profits’ (1999) 74 Tulane Law Review 133. For a similar proposal, see Richard Doernberg, above n 45
(suggesting that a permanent establishment concept be maintained, but that e-commerce importing
countries be permitted to levy a 10 percent withholding tax in the absence of a permanent
establishment). See also Chang Lee, above n 29, 2569 (“The right solution, from the perspective a
developing country, will be to impose taxes even without a permanent establishment and adopt
formulary apportionment.”). But see Brian Arnold, ‘Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business
Profits under Tax Treaties’ (2003) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 476, 492.
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purpose of treaty withholding. In other words, any payment for the production from
or use of property – whether in the form of the transfer of a tangible asset, an
intangible asset, or specialised knowledge or skills – should be characterized as a
royalty payment under tax treaties between high and low-income countries, and should
be subject to withholding tax.
As a step in this direction, in a number of treaties, countries have defined both “know
how” and “show how” or other fees associated with services provided with the
transfer of an intangible to be royalty payments, and have included payments for the
use of scientific equipment in the royalties article.69 Although these kinds of
payments might arguably be considered to be business profits, or profits from the
provision of services, they are payments that are difficult to unbundle, and defining
those payments as royalties ensures that investors from high-income countries are not
able to strip tax revenues from low-income countries simply by attempting to
characterize income at the margins of the business income/services income/royalties
income distinctions as non-source-taxed income. Canada has only rarely included fees
for included services within the scope of the royalties provision,70 while all of
Australia’s tax treaties (except Singapore) have some version of the fees for included
services provision. Both Canada and Australia generally include payments for
scientific equipment within the definition of royalties in their tax treaties.71
Once the business activities of an investor become significant in a low-tax jurisdiction,
the provisions of most tax treaties would ensure that the royalty payments are taxed as
business profits (because of the provision that characterizes royalties attributable to or
effectively connected with permanent establishments to be business profits), so at that
point, the decision-rule would no longer apply.
The primary drawback to this decision-rule is its possible effects on those who use or
reproduce property in small amounts. For example, a student who downloads a
videogame may be subject under this definition to withholding obligations. For
administrative reasons, then, it may make sense to provide a de minimis threshold like
those often provided in the dependent and independent personal services articles,
where users of property giving rise to royalties are only required to withhold and remit
tax once a low (cumulative by the user) threshold of value is passed, for example,
$5,000 per year. This would remove from the scope of taxation relatively low-value
transactions to low-use taxpayers in the source country, while still ensuring that the
purposes of imposing a withholding tax on royalty payments are met.
D. No Exemptions from or Reductions to the Withholding Tax Rate Should be
Granted for Particular Types of Royalty Payments
As explained above, royalties might be divided broadly into cultural royalties, such as
royalties in respect of copyrights, rights to produce artistic works, motion picture
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See Richard Doernberg’s discussion of the U.S. – India tax treaty and its inclusion of “included
services” in the royalties article ‘The U.S.-India Income Tax Treaty: Breaking New Group in Taxing
Services Income from Licensing Technology’ (1991) 44 Tax Lawyer 735.
70
See, eg, Canada’s treaties with Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, New
Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.
71
But see Canada’s tax treaties with Jamaica, Norway, and the United States, and Australia’s tax treaties
with the United Kingdom and the United States. It might also be noted that Canada imposes a
withholding tax of 15 percent on every person paying to a non-resident person a fee, commission or
other amount in respect of services rendered in Canada under Regulation 105.
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films, and tapes or films used for radio or television broadcast, and industrial royalties,
such as royalties for the use of patents, trademarks, designs, secret formula, knowhow,
and software. In some tax treaties, an exemption or lower rate of withholding is
granted to cultural or industrial royalties. These exemptions erode the revenue raising
capacity of the source country and are unjustified.
The exemption or lower rate of tax for cultural property commonly includes royalties
for the production or reproduction of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work but in
every case excludes royalties for motion picture films and broadcasting films and
tapes including those to be used for television broadcasting. One reason that royalties
derived from the use of films are commonly excluded from the exemption (and thus
subject to the full withholding rate for royalties) is that the withholding tax is
considered a proxy for taxing the salaries of the actors and other participants in the
film, which otherwise would only be taxed in the country of residence.72 The
exemption is generally justified on the grounds that cultural property developed in a
residence country has a much stronger economic nexus to that country than other
types of property that yield royalties in the source country.73 It is frankly difficult to
see why cultural property should be regarded as having a closer economic nexus to the
residence country than any other form of property that yields royalty income in the
source country. Like all forms of royalty-yielding property, it is the source country
that provides the market for the property and the rules of contract and property law
that protect its value.
Canada, in particular, has frequently also negotiated exemptions and lower rates of
withholding tax for three types of industrial royalties: payments for the use of, or the
right to use, (1) patents, (2) information concerning industrial, commercial or
scientific experience, and (3) computer software. The justification for these
exemptions is that a zero or reduced withholding tax will encourage the investment of
these properties in the source country. Slightly more than a decade ago, Canada
announced its intention to attempt to negotiate these exemptions in all of its treaties (to
exempt from the withholding tax royalties on computer software, patents, and
information concerning industrial, commercial, and scientific experience) in order
“reduce the cost to Canadian firms of accessing technology developed by foreign
firms” and to “make it more attractive for Canadian firms to export technology they
have developed.”74 Of course, to the extent that Canada taxes these royalty payments,
all these exemptions do is transfer tax revenue from low-income countries to the
Canadian government. Assuming the tax credit mechanism operates effectively, the
only real costs to Canadian investors are the transaction costs associated with paying
taxes in two jurisdictions. However, as argued above, these costs seem reasonable in
light of the benefits of source taxation, which include increased opportunities to detect
evasion, and in light of the benefits provided to investors in the form of government
services and protections for intellectual property in the source country.
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UN model convention, above n 24, commentary para 10.
Although occasionally this exemption is justified on the grounds that the dissemination of cultural
materials should be encouraged, and that the underpayment of authors should be recognized by
alleviating the potential for over-taxation of royalties on cultural material at source. See Alejandro
Heredia, ‘Copyright and Software and Spanish Tax Treaties: An Issue of Balance between TechnologyImporting and Technology-Exporting Countries’ (2006) 45(1) European Taxation 36, 42.
74
Canada, Department of Finance, Special Report: The Federal Budget (1993) 20.
73
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Even if there were a principled case for providing an exemption for certain types of
royalty payments, inevitably the conceptual and administrative costs of doing so
outweigh the gains. For example, exempting payments for the use of, or the right to
use, information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience requires
unbundling mixed contracts that contain those payments as well as otherwise taxable
payments into their component parts.75 Similarly, in treaties that exempt cultural
royalties for the use of, or right to use, any copyright of a literary work, but that do not
explicitly exempt software, determining whether payments for the use of software are
a literary copyright and therefore exempt have swamped tax administrators.76 In
addition, where one country exempts particular types of royalty payments from
withholding but another country does not, or where a country exempts some kinds of
royalty payments from withholding tax but does not exempt those payments in all of
its tax treaties, treaty shopping is encouraged.
Canada has negotiated exemptions from the royalties withholding tax in 26 of its 35
tax treaties with high-income countries (approximately 75 percent of such treaties) and
in 13 of its 53 tax treaties with low-income countries (approximately 25 percent of
such treaties), as shown in Appendix A. Thus although Canada is less likely to
negotiate exemptions with low-income countries, still in about one-quarter of those
treaties there are unjustified exemptions. In the great majority of the treaties with lowincome countries in which there are exemptions from the royalty withholding tax it is
an exemption for cultural property. In only four treaties is the exemption for industrial
property (Algeria, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine). Canada has negotiated reduced
rates of withholding in 14 of its 53 tax treaties with low-income countries
(approximately 26 percent). In most of these cases, Canada has granted a reduced rate
of withholding for both cultural and industrial royalties.
In stark contrast to Canada’s policy of negotiating exemptions and reduced rates for
royalty payments, Australia has negotiated an exemption from withholding tax in only
two cases (both with high-income countries – Canada and Singapore) and in only
three treaties (with low-income countries) has it negotiated a reduced rate of
withholding (Argentina, India, and Indonesia). In the case of Argentina the reduced
rates of withholding apply to both cultural and industrial royalties, while in the case of
India and Indonesia the reduced rates apply largely to industrial royalties.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS OVER ROYALTY PAYMENTS TO LOWINCOME COUNTRIES
Low-income countries ought not negotiate away their right to impose a withholding
tax on royalty payments earned in their jurisdiction. Source states have a strong
economic connection with royalty payments derived from property used in their
jurisdictions; source states provide benefits of significant value to investors who earn
royalties in their jurisdictions; a withholding tax is relatively easy to administer and
75

The concern about the difficulty of unbundling was raised by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee when Canada and the United States negotiated the 1995 Canada – United States Tax
Convention protocol. United States, Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Revised
Protocol Amending the Tax Convention with Canada, Executive Report 104-9, 104th Cong, 1st Sess,
(10 August 1995) 23–25.
76
In many, but certainly not all, of Canada’s tax treaties an exemption is set out for both cultural royalties
and payments for the use of software. For a discussion of the difficulties jurisdictions have in
distinguishing between those payments, see Heredia, ‘Copyright and Software and Spanish Tax
Treaties’, above n 72.
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comply with; source taxation provides the potential for residence and source countries
to work together to combat tax avoidance and evasion; and, taxation at source
diminishes the incentives for taxpayers to attempt to convert non-royalty income into
royalty income to avoid source-based taxation. None of the arguments in favour of
the non-taxation of royalties at source justify depriving low-income countries of the
revenue associated with the taxation of royalty income. While the property that yields
royalties has an economic nexus to the residence state where it was developed this
connection is no stronger than the connection of the royalty payment to the source
state; when a tax credit mechanism is used the taxpayer can still be taxed based on
ability to pay in the resident state; a withholding tax can be set that adequately reflects
the expenses (if there are any) associated with the production of royalty income in the
source country; workable rules for geographic source can be designed; and, the
evidence that a withholding tax on royalty payments increases the cost of the
technology transfer to licensees is weak. Thus, high-income countries ought to permit
tax withholding at source for royalty payments; they should ensure that withholding
tax rates negotiated with low-income countries are appropriate; they ought to resist
calls to tax income like royalties only when a sufficient threshold connection (like a
permanent establishment) has been reached; and, they ought to reduce or eliminate the
number of exemptions from and reductions to the withholding tax rate for royalty
payments.
The OECD model convention provides that source countries should not provide a
withholding tax on royalty payments. This aspect of the model treaty has been
followed in many of the US treaties with low-income countries and has been
implemented among states of the European Union. However, both Canada and
Australia have allowed source countries to collect withholding taxes in their treaties
with low-tax countries. Although each of these countries has made some effort to
provide low-income countries with a greater share of the tax revenue from the taxation
of royalties, each has room to better assist low-income countries. Canada has entered
into over twice the number of tax treaties as Australia, and has entered into over three
times the number of treaties with low-income countries as Australia. These treaties
facilitate trade and (at least in principle) can ensure that low-income countries receive
their fair share of tax revenue. Australia might consider expanding its tax treaty
network with low-income countries with which it has significant trade relations.
Canada and Australia have been roughly equally likely (controlling for the number of
treaties) to grant withholding tax rates on royalties in excess of 10 percent, but both
countries have granted only the standard 10 percent rate in over 50 percent of their
treaties with low-income countries. Tax administrators in both countries might be
urged to consider raising withholding tax rates when negotiating future tax treaties
with low-income countries, and might revisit the rationale for keeping withholding tax
rates on royalties low in the over 50 percent of the treaties with low-income countries
that maintain the 10 percent rate. Australia has been more generous than Canada both
in ensuring that included services are part of the royalties definition (therefore
exacting some of the tax revenue associated with the provision of included services)
and in avoiding unjustified exemptions from the scope of the royalty provision.
Canada should follow Australia’s lead on these issues.
Low-income countries’ need for increased revenue to assist in the development of
transportation and communication infrastructure, for the alleviation of extraordinary
depths of poverty, and for the improvement of education and health cannot be
questioned. Tax treaties provide at least one instrument that can assist low-income
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countries in developing their own revenue sources to improve the living conditions of
their citizens without needing to rely on transfers of conditional aid from high-income
countries and without exposing low-income countries to the uncompensated
exploitation of their markets from enterprises resident in high-income countries.
If the argument in this paper - namely, that low-income countries should be able to
impose a withholding tax of significance on royalty payments at source - is not
accepted, but the general proposition that source countries have a greater claim to the
tax revenues derived from the use of intangible properties in their countries than
currently reflected in tax treaties, then a range of alternatives might be considered.
For example, high-income countries could collect the share of the source tax on behalf
of the low-income country. This may be done by exempting royalties from
withholding tax at source, but by setting a revenue-split percentage rate on the profits
collected by high-income countries on royalty income earned by their residents in
another jurisdiction.77 If the concern were that withholding taxes exacted excessive
taxes from businesses engaged in the source country, as a more generous solution, the
residence country could consider designing a tax expenditure to support the sourcetaxation of the royalty payment. This expenditure would permit a refund of tax in the
residence state where the source-country tax exceeded the residence taxation of the
particular income stream. Lastly, to the extent that it is difficult to draw a bright line
between business income and royalty income, all non-resident enterprises that transfer
property into a source jurisdiction for use, whether the income from the property is
characterized as business or property income, could be subject to withholding tax on
the payments derived from the use of that property.
Tax treaties can be used to improve the living conditions of citizens of low-income
countries to the extent that they are fashioned to allocate revenues to source countries,
and to facilitate trade between low-income and high-income countries – two of the
means frequently identified as critical pillars in the international struggle to reduce
economic inequality. The revenue-raising aims of low-income countries ought to be
taken seriously in designing an international tax system for the taxation of royalty
payments, thereby ensuring a fairer allocation of tax revenues on income associated
with the use in low-income countries of property owned by residents of high-income
countries.

77

As a model, this might be designed in the same way that the federal government in Canada collects the
provincial tax of some provinces. The downside is that the source country would not get to define what
constitutes taxable income from property giving rise to a royalty payment and would simply need to
accept the domestic rules that applied in the residence country. However, this approach to revenue
sharing would alleviate the administrative burden on underdeveloped tax administrations, while still
ensuring an equitable share of the tax revenue from royalties was allocated to developing countries. But
see the suggestions of Reuven Avi-Yonah to impose a source withholding tax as a backstop to residence
taxation in ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (1996) 74 Texas
Law Review 1301, 1337.
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APPENDIX A A COMPARISON OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA’S TAX TREATY POSITIONS
ON WITHHOLDING TAX RATES AND EXEMPTIONS/REDUCTIONS FROM WITHHOLDING
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COUNTRY

EXEMPTION FROM WITHHOLDING

GDP
TREATY
RATE
(PPP) PARTNER WITHHELD

Australia

Canada
Can Aus

Can

Algeria

6,107

●

Argentina

12,106

●

Armenia

3,671

●

Australia

29,632

●

Austria

30,094

●

Azerbaijan

3,617

●

10

Bangladesh
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●

10

Barbados

15,720

●

Belgium

28,335

●

Brazil

7,790

●

Aus Cultural Patent Software Scientific
●

15
●

15

Australia

Canada

Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other

●
●

15

●

●

●

●

●

10
●

10
●

10

10

10

●

●

●

●
●

●

●

●

10
●

10

●

●

●

●

15

Bulgaria

7,731

●

10

Cameroon

2,118

●

15/20*

Canada

30,677

●

●
●
●

10

Chile

10,274

●

China

5,003

●

Croatia

11,080

●

Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

18,776

●

16,357

●

●

31,465

●

●

6,823

●

18

3,641

●

15

Egypt

3,950

●

15

Estonia

13,539

●

Fiji

5,880

Finland

27,619

●

●

10

10

●

France

27,677

●

●

10

10

●

●

●

●

Gabon

6,397

●

Germany

27,756

●

10

●

●

●

●

Guyana

4,230

●

Hungary

14,584

●

10

●

Iceland

31,243

●

●

●

●

India

2,892

●

●

15

15

Indonesia

3,361

●

●

10

15

Ireland

37,738

●

●

10

10

Israel

20,033

●

Italy

27,119

●

Ivory Coast

1,476

●

Jamaica

4,104

●

Japan

27,967

●

Jordan

4,320

●

Kazakhstan

6,671

●

Kiribati

800

Kenya

1,037

15
●

10

10

10
●

10
10

10

10

10

●

●

●

●

●
●

10
●

15
●
●

10
●

10
10

●

10

●

10

10

●

●
●

●

●

●

●

●

15
●

10

●

●

●

●

10
10
●

10

10

●

10
10
●

●

REDUCTION FROM WITHHOLDING RATE

15
15
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COUNTRY

EXEMPTION FROM WITHHOLDING

GDP
TREATY
RATE
(PPP) PARTNER WITHHELD
Canada
Can Aus

Can

Kuwait

18,047

●

Kyrgyzstan

1,751

●

10

Latvia

10,270

●

10

REDUCTION FROM WITHHOLDING RATE
Australia

Aus Cultural Patent Software Scientific

Canada

Australia

Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other

10
●

Lebanon

5,074

●

10

Lithuania

11,702

●

10

Luxembourg

62,298

●

Malaysia

9,512

●

●

15

15

●

Malta

17,633

●

●

10

10

●

●

15

10

●

●

10

●

●

●

●

●
●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●
●

Mexico

9,168

●

Moldova

1,510

●

10

Mongolia

1,850

●

10

●

Morocco

4,004

●

10

●

Netherlands

29,371

●

●

10

10

New Zealand

22,582

●

●

15

10

Nigeria

1,050

●

Norway

37,670

●

Oman

13,584

●

Pakistan
Papua New
Guinea
Peru

2,097

●

2,619

●

5,260

●

Philippines

4,321

●

●

Poland

11,379

●

●

Portugal
Republic of
Korea
Romania

18,126

●

17,971

●

●

15

7,277

●

●

10

10

Russia

9,230

●

●

10

10

●

●

●

●

12.5
●

10

10

10

10

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

15/20*
●

●

●

10

15
●

10/25* 25
10

10

●

10
15

Senegal

1,648

●

Singapore
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia

24,481

●

●

15

10

13,494

●

●

10

10

19,150

●

South Africa

10,346

●

●

10

10

Spain

22,391

●

●

10

10

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

15
●

●

●

10
●

Sri Lanka

3,778

●

●

10

10

●

Sweden

26,750

●

●

10

10

●

●

●

●

Switzerland

30,552

●

●

10

10

●

●

●

●

Tanzania

621

●

20
●

Taiwan

27,600

Thailand
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia

7,595

●

10,766

●

10

7,161

●

15

●

UAE

22,420

●

10

●

●

12.5
15

●

15
●

●

●

●
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COUNTRY

EXEMPTION FROM WITHHOLDING

GDP
TREATY
RATE
(PPP) PARTNER WITHHELD
Canada
Can Aus

UK

27,147

●

Ukraine

5,491

●

●

Can
10

●

●

●

Canada

Australia

Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other Cultural Patent Software Scientific Other

●

●

10
●

Australia

Aus Cultural Patent Software Scientific
5

REDUCTION FROM WITHHOLDING RATE

US

37,562

●

Uzbekistan

1,744

●

10

●

●

●

●

Venezuela

4,919

●

10

●

●

●

●

Vietnam

2,490

●

●

10

10

Zambia

877

●

15

Zimbabwe

2,443

●

10

5

●

●

●

●

●

10

* Canada's withholding rate / other party's withholding rate
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